Ronald Coase has had a profound impact on the study of property rights, more so than any other modern thinker. There is an irony and a paradox in this. The irony is that Coase never intended to have such an impact. As he has said -most recently in the video interview that introduced the Coase Centennial Conference -his scholarly objective was to illuminate the impact of the legal system on the working of the economy, not to advance our understanding about how economic forces may influence the law. 
I. COASE'S INFLUENCE ON OUR NOTION OF PROPERTY
Before we isolate the limits of Coase's picture of property it is important to recognize some of the many ways in which Coase has influenced our understanding of property. A complete catalogue of influences would be nearly impossible. We will highlight five developments in property theory, each of which can be traced to Coase's seminal mid-career work, most importantly The Problem of Social Cost. First, Coase's insight that externalities can be internalized by contractual exchanges of property rights formed the foundation of the new institutional approach to property rights. In particular, Harold Demsetz, picking up where Coase left off, perceived that externalities can also be internalized by creating new property rights where none existed before. 3 Coase saw that proposed contracts to modify rights (whether such proposals are accepted or rejected) cause actors to take account of how their actions with respect to resources impact others; through this process, contractual exchange of rights can lead to the use of resources that maximizes social value. Demsetz saw that new arrangements of property rights -especially creating property rights in previously open access resources -bring home to owners how their actions with respect to these resources affect the valuation that others place on those resources. The emergence of property rights thus tends toward the use of resources that maximizes social value. This
Demsetzian variation on the original Coasean logic gave rise to a powerful economic theory explaining the evolution of property rights over time. 4 Second, Coase's emphasis on the importance of transaction costs in determining the structure of economic institutions carried with it implications for the protection of entitlements. Very Coasean in spirit is Guido Calabresi's and Douglas Melamed's landmark distinction between property rules and liability rules as modes of protection of property rights. 5 Property rule protection permits the transfer of rights only with the consent of the rights holder, typically through voluntary exchange. Liability rule protection permits the transfer of rights without the consent of the rights holder, conditioned on the payment of government-determined compensation for the rights taken.
The principal explanation given by Calabresi and Melamed for the turn to liability rules in various contexts was high transaction costs. That is, when transaction costs make it difficult to reallocate entitlements through consensual transactions and/or litigation, this supplies a justification for switching from property rule to liability rule protection in order to achieve allocative efficiency. 6 This is a direct application of Coase's central insight about the critical role of transaction costs, deployed here as an explanation for an important feature of the structure of legal rights.
Third, Coase's emphasis on the importance of transaction costs in determining whether rights will be exchanged stimulated a number of insights into how legal institutions are designed to facilitate transactions. Examples include the use of rules rather than standards in defining property rights, 7 the use of rectilinear rather than meandering property boundaries, 8 the adoption of land titling and registration systems, 9 and the importance of the numerus clausus in limiting the number of property forms. 10 In 6 Id. at 1106-07. 7 See Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. Legal Stud. 13, 16 (1985) (noting that the ad coelum rule for defining rights to land involves " [n] o weighing or balancing of costs and benefits," but rather is "exceptionally simple and exceptionally rigorous" (internal citations omitted)). 106 Yale L.J. 2175 106 Yale L.J. , 2179 106 Yale L.J. (1997 (discussing property's preference for leaving parties with either the "whole meatball" or "zip"). Obviously, this is by any measure an extraordinary -indeed a stunning -legacy for one thinker. The focus on externalities, the possibility of reducing externalities through exchange of rights, the role of transaction costs in determining the feasibility of exchange of rights, and the need for measuring proposals for regulation against the benchmark of exchange of rights -these ideas were transformative. Coase's cluster of ideas, either singularly or in combination, have had a revolutionary impact on our collective understanding of property rights.
II. COASE'S PICTURE OF PROPERTY
Throughout his writings, but especially in his highly influential papers on the 21 This was the picture of property as a kind of mini-sovereignty. To be an owner, according to this picture, is to be the ruler over some thing. Just as the king was understood to be the ruler of the realm, so the owner of property was the ruler over some Blackacre or chattel within the realm.
Federal Communications Commission
William Blackstone, a master synthesizer of conventional wisdom, expressed the idea quite directly. Property, he said, is that "sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe."
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The notion of property as a type of sovereignty was an exaggeration, as
Blackstone himself seems to have been aware. 23 Regulation, taxation, and liability for uses of property that harm others always constrained the discretion of property owners.
But the picture of property as sovereignty had one great virtue. It captured the idea that property rights are in rem, meaning that property rights create duties of noninterference in all persons.
The distinctive feature of rights in rem is best understood in contrast to rights in personam. In personam rights, such as rights created by contract or by judgment, attach to specific individuals and are paired with duties in other specific individuals. Thus, if A promises to deliver widgets to B in return for cash, A and B have specific rights that are defined in terms of specific duties that they owe to each other -either to deliver the widgets or the cash. Similarly, if C obtains a restraining order against D, C's rights to be free of interference by D and D's duties to desist from interfering with C are defined with respect to and are specific to each other.
In rem rights, in contrast, are rights that create duties of noninterference in all other persons, not just in specifically identified others. Individual rights of bodily integrity, reputation, and privacy protected by the law of tort are in rem rights in this sense. Similarly, property rights are in rem, in that they create duties of noninterference with things marked in conventional ways as being owned, which duties apply as a matter of law to all persons. Thus, if Blackacre is marked as an owned thing -perhaps because it has a fence or hedge around it -all other persons are subject to a duty not to invade The Realists' motivation for advancing the bundle of rights picture was political.
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The Realists sought to "de-privilege" property as the post-modernists would say -"dethrone" might be a more appropriate expression in this context -in order to facilitate more extensive collective control over property, especially through programs of redistribution.
But the bundle of rights picture had a side effect, quite possibly unintended, in that it obscured the in rem character of property rights. The mini-sovereign picture puts the in rem feature front and center. Just as everyone in the realm owes a duty of obedience to the king, without regard to whether they have personally sworn allegiance to the king, so everyone owes a duty of noninterference to the owner of property, whether or not any one of them has met the owner or promised to respect the owner's rights to the owned thing. Also, just as the king has very broad discretionary authority in determining what happens in the realm (at least in the days before parliamentary democracy appeared on the scene), so the owner of property has very broad discretionary authority in determining how owned things are used. 29 See, e.g., Coase, supra note 2, at 15 (describing the reasoning of the judges in resolving nuisance cases as frequently resting on factors that seem "strange to an economist," such as the doctrine of the lost grant, which he says is "about as relevant as the colour of the judge's eyes"). 30 Merrill & Smith, supra note 19.
The rights of a land-owner are not unlimited. It is not even always possible for him to remove the land to another place, for instance, by quarrying it. And although it may be possible for him to exclude some people from using "his" land, this may not be true of others. For example, some people may have the right to cross the land. Furthermore, it may or may not be possible to erect certain types of buildings or to grow certain crops or to use particular drainage systems on the land. This does not come about simply because of Government regulation. It would be equally true under the common law. In fact it would be true under any system of law. A system in which the rights of individuals were unlimited would be one in which there were no rights to acquire.
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The conclusion Coase draws from these observations is quite striking: "We may speak of a person owning land and using it as a factor of production but what the land-owner in fact possesses is the right to carry out a circumscribed list of actions." 32 This passage rather clearly indicates that Coase understood property not as any distinctive right to a thing imposing duties of noninterference on all others, but rather as a bundle or collection of rights to carry out or desist from certain actions with respect to resources.
Even more striking is the discussion in the 1959 article on the Federal Communications Commission, which served as a precursor to the more famous article on social cost published the next year. There, Coase was directly concerned with making the case for establishing a market in rights to the use of radio spectrum frequencies, or what might loosely be termed "spectrum rights." The nature of property rights was more central to this project than to the more influential article on social cost.
In making the case for allocating spectrum rights by contract, Coase had to confront a variety of arguments to the effect that private property rights in the radio portion of the electromagnetic spectrum are too difficult to define and enforce, given the invisible 31 Coase, supra note 2, at 44. 32 Id.
nature of the resource and our limited understanding of the circumstances in which one type of use of the radio spectrum will interfere with another. Coase sought to address these concerns by suggesting that privatization of spectrum rights should proceed not by defining exclusive rights in a portion of the "ether" or in particular radio frequencies, but rather by specifying use rights in broadcasting equipment. As he summarized his position:
What does not seem to have been understood is that what is being allocated by the Federal Communications Commission, or, if there were a market, what would be sold, is the right to use a piece of equipment to transmit signals in a particular way. Once the question is looked at in this way, it is unnecessary to think in terms of ownership of frequencies or the ether.
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Lest there be any ambiguity about Coase's preference for defining the proposed property rights in terms of permitted uses of broadcasting equipment, he turned immediately to certain suggestions that rights to radio spectrum could be determined by analogy to air rights over land. Coase thought that this way of thinking of the problem "tends to obscure the question that is being decided." 34 He continued: "[W]hether we have the right to shoot over another man's land has been thought of as depending on who owns the airspace over the land. It would be simpler to discuss what we should be allowed to do with a gun." 35 Coase's preference for defining property rights in terms of permitted uses was here revealed in the starkest possible terms. Coase thought it was unduly complicated to try to describe a landowner's rights in terms of a general rule 33 Coase, supra note 17, at 33. 34 Id. at 34.
35 Id. about the right of the owner to exclude intrusions by strangers from a delimited spacethe traditional in rem approach. Far better to draw up a list of permissible uses of a gun. We commonly think of the process of allocating radio frequencies as being similar to that by which a stone which is extracted from a quarry is allocated to various users. But, in looking at the question this way, we tend to forget that the stone can only be used in certain ways. What the owner of a piece of stone can do with it is strictly limited; but what he can do with it defines the property rights which adhere to ownership of a piece of stone. And the same would be true for the ownership of radio frequencies.
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The draft study also offered, in the next chapter, an "alternative approach" to establishing exchangeable rights in spectrum. 41 This alternative conception would have defined the relevant units to be exchanged in terms of outputs, namely, in reference to a particular segment of bandwidth that could be broadcast over a particular area, with the owner given a right to exclude all "admissions" by others into this frequency in this area.
This alternative approach is squarely grounded in a conception of property as an in rem right of exclusion -the traditional legal understanding. The alternative analysis is written in an impersonal passive voice, cites primarily technical engineering materials, and 38 Coase, Meckling, & Minasian, supra note 37, at 73-98 (Chapter III: "The Radio Frequency Spectrum as a Scarce Resource"). 39 Id. at 94. 40 Id. at 93. 41 Id. at 99-176 (Chapter IV: "Property Rights in Radiation: Alternative Approach").
adopts the style of a professional American academic journal. It was almost certainly written by one of Coase's co-authors, Jora Minasian, who a decade later published an article very close to the "alternative approach" chapter in the Rand study.
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The evidence from the draft study is admittedly not conclusive about Coase's views on property in the mid-1960s. The draft does not expressly acknowledge that different authors wrote the different chapters, nor does it acknowledge that there was any disagreement among the authors about the proper way to conceive of property rights in radio frequencies. Nevertheless, we believe the draft study provides at least circumstantial evidence that Coase continued to adhere to his understanding of property as a bundle of use rights. The chapter that adopts the property-as-inputs conception refers to the author in the first person as Coase, and clearly rehearses the Coasean view.
The "alternative approach" grounded in exclusion rights bears no evidence of Coase's style of writing. It would not be uncommon for three authors of a consulting report to "agree to disagree" on a significant point like this by presenting their competing views as "alternative" ways of thinking about a problem. We strongly suspect that is what happened in the draft study. collected at the ports by agents for the lighthouses. The problem of enforcement was no different for them than for other suppliers of goods and services to the shipowner. The property rights were unusual only in that they stipulated the price that could be charged. There is no difficulty in employing the same approach which I found useful in discussing the allocation of the radio frequency spectrum for the analysis of problems which economists are more accustomed to handle. Someone having the right to build a factory on a piece of land (and wishing to exercise that right) would normally also secure the right to prevent someone else from, say, planting wheat on it; and if the operation of the factory created noise or led to the emission of smoke, the factory-owner would wish to have the right to do this. The factory-owner would chose to use a particular site and create noise and emit smoke because this would produce a higher net income than alternative sites or modes of operation. Exercise of these rights would, of course, deny the use of the land to agriculturalists and clean air to others. . . . What this approach makes clear is that there is no difference, analytically, between rights such as those to determine how a piece of land should be used and those, for example, which enable someone in a given location to emit smoke.
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Here we find Coase explicitly endorsing the bundle of rights conception, and explicitly extending it from property rights in unusual resources like the radio spectrum to conventional rights in land. Some of his language even goes so far as to suggest there is no standard default bundle of land ownership, but merely ad hoc collections of use rights, assembled one tract at a time. Thus, for example, he says that someone buying land for a factory "would normally also secure the right to prevent someone else from, say, planting wheat on it." 54 We seriously doubt that Coase entertained the notion that property rights are purely ad hoc assemblages of rights and privileges, like ingredients at a Mongolian barbecue restaurant. More likely he should be understood as saying that the common law has defined certain default package of use rights associated with land, which in the ordinary case would include the right to build a factory and to exclude someone else who wanted to use the land to plant wheat. But clearly he conceived of each use right as contingent on the evolved state of the law, and as freely exchangeable through contracting. This is the bundle of rights picture of property. 53 Id. 11-12 (emphasis added). 54 Id. at 11.
III. PROPERTY AS AN IN REM RIGHT
As should be obvious from the many examples of influence we cited in Part I, Coase's picture of property did not inhibit rapid progress in the development of the economic analysis of property. Nevertheless, we will argue that Coase's picture of property had a distorting influence, and in certain respects may have impeded intellectual progress in developing our understanding of the institution of property.
Notwithstanding the impressive payoffs from Coase's work, the list-of-uses conception of property implicit in his articles also had its costs. The picture of property as an ever-mutable bundle of rights has long blinded economic scholars to the in rem features of property, which means that they have ignored or downplayed certain dimensions of any system of property rights. We will mention three key implications that flow from the in rem understanding of property that were long overlooked in the wake of Coase.
First, the bundle of rights picture fails to capture the centrality of exclusion rights to the institution of property. Because the owner has the right to exclude the world, the owner assumes the role of gatekeeper or manager of the asset. 55 This means, among other things, that the owner has a powerful incentive to invest in and develop the asset, because the owner will capture the benefit of these actions as the residual claimant. 56 See, e.g., Barzel, supra note 14, at 3-4 (introducing theory in which the notion of rights "is closely related to that of residual claimancy," and the notion of property rights "is closely related to that of transaction costs," because the residual claimant enjoys attributes of assets that cannot be captured in contracts due to transaction costs.); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777 (1972) (describing the residual claimant as one with incentives to reduce shirking and with the most significant management potential).
Thus, exclusion accounts for the dynamic efficiency of property, as opposed to the allocational efficiency that comes from the free exchange of rights. Under the bundle of rights picture, in contrast, the exclusion right fades into the background as part of the general bundle of sticks, no more important than the right to inherit or the right to use the asset for particular purposes.
Second, the bundle of rights picture fails to highlight the enormous information cost constraints associated with any system of in rem rights. This is most pronounced if we think about the situation of potential violators of in rem rights. 57 If everyday property -rights to land and chattels -entails rights to exclude all the world from some thing, this sets up a potentially severe information cost problem for potential violators of these rights. The costs of communicating information about rights and duties in a world that consists solely of in personam or A-to-B rights would be significant. Each person would have to be aware of and comprehend all the obligations that they had personally undertaken or that had been imposed upon them. The costs of communicating information about in rem rights and duties which apply to "everyone" are potentially much greater. If every property right was described by a customizable list of permitted uses -as Coase imagined with respect to stones from different quarries or individual British lighthouses -and these rights had to be understood and respected by all the world, the resulting information costs would be staggering.
This in turn suggests that the messages about everyday property must be very simple -messages like "keep off" or "don't touch" -couched in concepts readily 57 See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra Rev. 711, 724-25 (1983) (ascribing this resistance to psychological differences between economic and common-law conceptions of causation). 66 See, e.g., Clifford G. Holderness, A Legal Foundation for Exchange, 14 J. Legal Stud. 321 (1985) .
disappears if we assume zero transaction costs, then this significantly undermines the heuristic value of the assumption of zero transaction costs, since the transaction costs differ enormously depending on the assignment of rights.
Is the basic package of rights associated with the in rem picture of property a mystification or legal irrelevancy, like the color of the judge's eyes? 67 Our answer is no, and that answer relates back to the Coase Theorem, but in a more thoroughgoing way than envisioned by Coase. It is time to turn the Coasean spotlight back on the picture of property as a bundle of sticks.
IV. PROPERTY AND THE COASE COROLLARY
Not only was Coase's picture of property wholly tangential to the major contributions that have flowed from his pathbreaking work, it was inconsistent with the main tenor of his work. Although Coase aimed to show the influence of the legal system on the workings of the economic system, his framework, as we have seen, has been immensely fruitful as a tool of institutional analysis. In this spirit we apply Coase's framework to the notion of property itself -an important legal and economic institution if ever there was one.
Coase did not present his work in The Problem of Social Cost as a theorem, but starting with George Stigler in the mid 1960's, Coase's argument that in a zero transaction cost world people will always reach the wealth-maximizing result through contracting (or other equally costless institutional responses) has come to be known as the "Coase Theorem." 68 Coase much later summarized his article as "show [ing] . . . that, 67 See supra note 29.
68 George J. Stigler, The Theory of Price 113 (3d ed. 1966) (stating Coase Theorem as proposition that "under perfect competition private and social costs will be equal").
in the absence of transaction costs, it does not matter what the law is, since people can always negotiate without cost to acquire, subdivide, and combine rights whenever this would increase the value of production." 69 The point of the exercise was to show the importance of transaction costs in the real world of positive social costs. Far from endorsing a view of the world based on an assumption of zero transaction costs, Coase's aim was a nearly the opposite. As he wrote:
The world of zero transaction costs has often been described as a Coasean world. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is the world of modern economic theory, one which I was hoping to persuade economists to leave.
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By pointing out the strangeness of the proposition that the "legal position" is irrelevant to the pattern of production, Coase was highlighting the importance of transaction costs to institutional design.
The relevant institutions go far beyond the thin question of who, as between a pair of actors, will be liable for an activity involving a resource conflict. known as the Coase Theorem is closely related to his earlier work on the theory of the firm. 72 In that article Coase showed that the boundary of the firm can only be explained by the relative costs of carrying out transactions within the firm (by fiat) and outside the firm in the market (by market contracting). In other words, "in the absence of transaction costs, there is no basis for the existence of firms." 73 Another critical institution is property itself. We have property and endow it with a basic architecture of exclusion rules supplemented by rules and standards governing proper use, precisely because of transaction costs. The term "transaction costs" in a sense
replicates some of the hidden bias towards contracts and away from property in Coase's seminal work. The term "transaction costs" can be taken narrowly or broadly. 74 For institutional analysis -or in other words "transaction cost economics" -the frictions captured by the term "transaction costs" go beyond the costs of exchange in the sense of a quid pro quo. Coase was preoccupied the costs of exchange of rights, and treated transaction costs as the resources that must be expended "to discover who it is that one wishes to deal with . . . and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up a contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on." 75 But transaction costs also include other costs of institutions. Most relevant for us are all the resources that must be expended in order to determine what is being exchanged -the costs of delineating, 72 R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica (n.s.) 386 (1937). 73 Coase, supra note 1, at 14. 74 See Douglas W. Allen, What Are Transaction Costs?, 14 Res. L. & Econ. 1 (1991) (arguing that transaction costs are better defined as the costs of establishing property rights, in the economist's sense of a de facto ability to derive utility from an action, rather than narrowly as the costs of exchange). 75 Coase, supra note 2 at 15. Indeed, in a zero transaction cost world, it would not matter whether we had anything like property law at all. 81 We could, instead, just as easily regard "property" as being the solution of all pairwise conflicts between members of society with respect to each potential resource conflict -the most extreme bundle of rights picture of property imaginable. The delineation, understanding, and enforcement of these highly atomized rights would cost no more than a system in which rights were understood as having a standardized form and as imposing duties of respect on all persons. And, as we saw earlier, the highly atomized list of uses approach to property is Coase's picture of property.
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But as with the Coase Theorem, the lesson of the Coase Corollary is to subject the notion of property to comparative institutional analysis, and it is here that we argue that 81 Steven Cheung recognized that a thoroughgoing version of the zero transaction cost assumption would remove the need for property rights at all. See Cheung, supra note 79, at 518-20. Coase has agreed in principle with this observation. See Coase, supra note 1, at 14-15.
the extreme bundle picture of property comes up far short. Indeed, this hyper-Realist picture is plausible (much less realistic) only in a zero transaction cost world -the world Coase tried to persuade economists to leave.
In our positive transaction cost world, the lumpy, in rem property rights are no accident precisely because they save on delineation, understanding, and enforcement costs. Further, in our positive transaction cost world one should expect to find a significant degree of standardization of rights, precisely because this would save on delineation, understanding, and enforcement costs. This is not to say that rights will be maximally standardized. There is an inevitable tradeoff between the reduction of information costs through standardization of rights and the need for flexibility in offering This not to say that owners always win. For one thing, the sovereignty afforded owners through the exclusion strategy is only a starting point. The presumption that owners can veto invasions sometimes gives way -to the need for airplane overflights and antidiscrimination law, to take two examples. 85 And sometimes owners will not be able to shut down activities emitting sound or odors -for example, if the locality is characterized by such activities. 86 In other situations, owners may be relegated to a remedy of damages rather than an injunction. 87 These questions too all turn in part on considerations of transaction costs -both the entitlement determination and processing costs and the (narrower) transaction costs associated with potential exchanges. 88 But analyzing these important use conflicts from a transaction cost point of view should not obscure the important starting point: for transaction cost reasons we start with sovereign owners exercising the right to exclude over clearly delineated things, and we use this starting point to resolve a wide range of resource conflicts.
The Coase Corollary also calls into question aspects of Calabresi and Melamed's
Coase-inspired analysis of property rules and liability rules. 89 As one of us has written, Calabresi and Melamed's assumption of a thin notion of entitlement is essential to the "symmetry" result in their framework. 90 But the thin notion of entitlement, drawn as it is from Coase and the zero transaction cost world, breaks down in the face of the need for significant standardization of rights in our positive transaction cost world. 91 If A is sending emissions from A's land to B's land, we are not in a position to be as agnostic about the direction of causation as we might be in a zero transaction cost world. Even the law of nuisance takes the right to be free from a wide range of invasions into the owner's column of space as the starting point. 92 This principle of owner entitlement saves on delineation costs, as opposed to the thin set of sticks in a giant list of use conflicts.
Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 Va. L. Rev. 965, 1037 -45 (2004 (arguing for stronger but rebuttable presumption for injunctions in nuisance cases based on information cost advantages of property rules).
So if under Rule 1 the resident has the entitlement to be free from pollution protected by a property rule (injunction) and under Rule 2 has the entitlement protected by a liability rule -meaning that the polluter can pollute and pay officially determined damages -the question arises what it would mean to "flip things around." Calabresi and Melamed believe that, in accord with Coasean causal symmetry, the polluter could be given the "entitlement" and then we face a parallel choice between protecting that entitlement with a property rule (Rule 3) or a liability rule (Rule 4). What they envision is a situation in which the factory owner can pollute but the resident cannot get a remedy, thus forcing the resident to pay the polluter if the pollution is to stop. 93 But this is not truly parallel or symmetric to the Rule 1 situation. 94 If it were, then the factory owner would have a right to pollute. If the resident puts up a giant fan and blows the pollution back, can the polluter get an injunction? If not, there is no "right" to pollute but rather an ability to get away with it. As part of the default package of property rights no one has the right to pollute in this robust sense (entailing a right to enjoin fans). The factory owner could have a right to pollute if it has an easement (by grant or prescription), which might give it the right to enjoin fans, but this is an add-on to the baseline default package of rights in land. When it comes to the resource conflict there is an entitlement structure in place and it breaks the symmetry that Calabresi and Melamed are relying on. Another reason for the rarity of rule 4 is that it requires collecting potential plaintiffs to avoid freerider problems, as for example in a class action. In Spur, the developer, who made the decision to build close to the feedlot, was the one suing rather than the residents, but to the extent that this matters to courts, developers will try to avoid being the plaintiff in the future. 97 Merrill & Smith, supra note 19, and not vice versa. Conventional in rem property rights are not the only source of baseline entitlements, 98 but they are a wholesale source of them.
This lack of symmetry is also at the root of the "gravitational" pull that the ad coelum rule exerts in many contexts. 99 Even in situations governed by social norms we find that norms based on the ad coelum approach are more widespread than a comparison of values of the conflicting activities would warrant. Thus in the prototypical Coasean example of wandering cattle and trampled crops, 100 cattle have to be significantly more important than crops to flip from fencing in (rancher liability) to fencing out (rancher nonliability). 101 Even norms tend to track the ad coelum rule, with fencing in norms being more widespread than one would expect on an approach of choosing the more valuable activity for the immediate area. 102 Likewise, general norms of possession seem to form powerful defaults: in the law of possession, certain control over a thing is a default requirement unless an important resource clearly cries out for different treatment. Robert Ellickson found a pattern of nineteenth-century whaling norms that can be seen as conforming to a simple general rule with an exception for special important situations. 103 Under the "fast-fish-loose-fish" rule, the first harpooner gets the whole whale as long as whale is attached to his boat.
This rule, which accords with general notions of certain control in first possession, applied to right whales, which are relatively slow-moving, and to whales generally, with some major exceptions. Under the "iron-holds-the-whale" or "first-iron" rule, the first harpooner would get exclusive rights to the whale as long as he was in fresh pursuit, which requires more judgment. The first-iron rule tended to be adopted where the very valuable but very dangerous sperm whales were predominant. For finback whales, which sink and rise to the surface, the custom was marking with a bomb lance and a small fee to finders who were obligated to report beached marked finbacks. 104 Ellickson argues that these norms confirm his hypothesis that close-knit groups will devise efficient norms among themselves (but with the possibility of outgroup externalities, like overexploitation). 105 But note that the general norm of first possession based on certain control is the default rule for whales. 106 Simple baselines matter, and they matter because of information costs -an important species of transaction costs. Again, it is the Coase Corollary in action.
Finally, the distinction between in rem and in personam rights, which lies at the heart of the traditional property/contract distinction, is likewise a product of transaction costs. In a zero transaction cost world, one could re-describe in rem rights against all the world in terms of a congeries of in personam rights, as Hohfeld imagined. 107 That is, one could cash out the idea of A having a right against all the world as being equivalent to A having a right against B, a right against C, a right against D, etc. This equivalence would hold, however, only in the world of the Coase Corollary. In the real world of positive transaction costs, it is prohibitively costly to list everyone in the world in order to describe all the persons who are bound by A's having an right in rem. Likewise, contracting pairwise would be unfeasibly costly. Instead, it is necessary to solve many problems "wholesale" through in rem rights -including core property rights -which impose automatic duties of noninterference on all persons who may or may not encounter the owned property, whoever they may be, and whether or not they have any conception of who the owner might be. In our world of positive transaction costs, in rem duties are not and cannot be equivalent to an enormously long list of in personam duties.
By having the right to exclude from some thing, A is given "sovereignty" over a range of largely unspecified uses as against a largely unspecified set of dutyholders. We do not deny that many aspects of property differ according to conditions of time, place, and culture. But we would argue that defining property in terms of things as a starting point, grouping of uses under exclusion rights, and the widespread employment of in rem rights are no accident: they receive a transaction cost explanation. Establishing starting points or baselines in property is not a trivial problem, and for transaction cost reasons could not be replicated by contract. Establishing such baselines is thus, to borrow a phrase, an "essential role" of the law of property. 108 The need for the baseline entitlements to be largely unspecified is a direct result of the Coase Corollary. Positive transaction costs in our world make it advantageous to economize on the costs of delineating, understanding, and enforcing entitlements. Hence the preference for the traditional notion of property as opposed to the bundle of rights. Rather than Coase's atomized picture of property, our positive transaction cost world exhibits the highly standardized, truly "Coasean" property familiar from the law of property.
CONCLUSION
In this essay, we have sought to make Coasean property more Coeasean. We Coase's picture of property was wholly tangential to the major contributions that have flowed from his seminal articles. The importance of transaction costs in the design of legal institutions, the importance of contracting as a device for internalizing externalities, the need to engage in comparative institutional analysis in proposing solutions to problems of social cost -all these transformative insights could have been made and their value fully realized without accepting the bundle of rights picture of property.
We have gone further, and have also argued that applying Coasean economicinstitutional analysis to the institution of property itself reveals a Coasean rationale for traditional notions of property as an in rem right to a thing. To this end, we introduced the Coase Corollary, which states that in a zero transaction cost world, the nature and scope of property is irrelevant to the value of production. As with the Coase Theorem, from which it directly follows, the point of the Coase Corollary is that in our positive transaction cost world the nature and scope of property do matter to the allocation of resources and the value of production. The truly Coasean approach is to engage in comparative institutional analysis of the notion of property itself. Here baselines matter, and because of positive transaction costs -and in particular, the costs of delineating, understanding, and enforcing rights -"entitlements" are built using an in rem exclusion strategy to define things and take care of many conflicts wholesale, with refinements governing uses through institutions like zoning, nuisance, contracts, and norms.
Traditional property as defined in law turns out to be quite Coasean after all.
